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CRIMINAL LAW - HYPNOSIS AS
FORCE IN ROBBERY. - [Alabama]
Prosecutrix, chief witness for the
state, met defendant and soon after-
ward, according to her testimony,
he hypnotized her, or put her under
a spell. At defendant's request
prosecutrix obtained her bank books
from her home two miles away,
went to the banks unaccompanied,
and drew out $290. She then re-
turned to where the defendant was
waiting and handed the money to
him. Prosecutrix was not fright-
ened when she drew out her money,
and there was no contention that
violence was committed upon her.
Defendant was convicted of rob-
bery, and appeals on the ground
that the evidence does not sustain
the charge. Held: Judgment re-
versed. The element of "fear," es-
sential to robbery, is lacking, al-
though defendant may be guilty of
some other crime. Louis v. State
(Court of Appeals of Alabama
1930) 130 So. 904.
The question as to just what acts
constitute force or fear in robbery
is one involving much judicial con-
struction. Possibility of robbery by
hypnosis presents that question in
its most bizarre form.
There are very few cases involv-
ing hypnosis in crime to be found
in the reports: Cf. Sloan "Hyp-
notism as a Defense to Crime."
(1924) 42 Medico-Legal Journal
37; Note (1897) 40 L. R. A. 269.
In the cases most frequently cited
as authority on the subject of hyp-
nosis, People v. Worthington
(1894) 105 Cal. 166, 38 Pac. 689,
and People v. Ebanks (1897) 117
Cal. 665, .49 Pac. 1049, it is obvious
that no genuine question of hyp-
nosis arose. Hypnosis was used as
a desperate defense to a criminal
charge in each case, and so the
above mentioned cases can by no
means be considered a judicial re-
fusal to recognize hypnosis as a
natural phenomenon. See Sloan,
op. cit., supra, at p. 48.
In the instant case the court
adopted the accepted common law
definition of robbery as "the feloni-
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ous taking of money, or goods of
value, from the person of another,
or in his presence, by violence to
his person, or by putting him in
fear." The court next accepted the
modern definition of hypnosis from
Webster's New International Dic-
tionary as: "a name applied to a
condition, artificially produced, in
which the person hypnotized, ap-
parently asleep, acts in obedience to
the will of the operator." If the
above premises are adhered to, it is
clear that logically hypnosis is not
the equivalent of the essential ele-
ment of force or fear lii the crime
of robbery.
It is generally held that the use
of some force in the taking of prop-
erty or the putting of the injured
party in fear is essential to con-
stitute robbery: Monaghan v. State
(1913) 10 Okla, Crim. 89, 134 Pac.
77, 46 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1149; Jones
v. Commonwealth (1902) 112 Ky.
689, 66 S. W. 633, 57 L. R. A. 432;
State v. Parsons (1906) 44 Wash.
299, 87 Pac. 349, 7 L. R. A. (N. s.)
566. However, force and fear often
become little more than mental
domination of the victim by the ac-
cused. Thus where defendant put
a gun against a bank messenger's
back and commanded him to drop
the bag he was carrying, a convic-
tion for robbery was sustained:
State v. Redmond (1922) 122 Wash
392, 210 Pac. 772. It may be ques-
tioned whether "fear" or merely a
potent type of "suggestion" caused
the bank messenger to drop the bag.
See also Sutton v. State (1924) 162
Ark. 438, 258 S. W. 632. But filch-
ing money from a drunken victim's
pocket while helping him home is
not robbery: People v. Jones
(1919) 290 Ill. 603, 125 N. E. 256;
Hall v. People (1898) 171 Ill. 540,
49 N. E. 495. Likewise taking
money from a victim by slipping
a hand in his .pocket while a con-
federate engages him in conversa-
tion has been held not to be rob-
bery: State v. Parker (1914) 262
Mo. 169, 170 S. W. 1121, L. R. A.
1915C 121. Contra: Snyder v.
Commonwealth (1900) 21 Ky. Law
Rep. 1538, 55 S. W. 679 (Jostling
by confederate).
In the instant case, through the
application of the doctrine of con-
structive force there lies a logical
pathway for the interpretation of
hypnosis as force, sufficient to bring
the case within the category of rob-
bery, had the court so desired. Thus
in a case in which the defendant
drugged the bartender of a saloon,
and while the latter was uncon-
scious, took money from the cash
register, the court affirmed a con-
viction for robbery on the ground
that such taking involved construc-
tive force, reasoning entirely by
analogy from rape cases in which
the female was drugged, or was
otherwise made unable to resist:
State v. Snyder (1919) 41 Nev. 453,
172 Pac. 364, L. R. A. 1918E 933.
In a prosecution for seduction in
which there was hypnosis of the
female by the defendant, the court
sustained a conviction on the
ground that hypnosis of the victim
was a destruction of the woman's
power of resistance: State v. Don-
ovan (1905) 128 Iowa 45, 102 N.
W. 791. If hypnosis is considered
as destroying a woman's power of
resistance, and overcoming the
power of resistance in such man-
ner is constructive force, it would
follow that hypnosis of a robbery
victim is a form of constructive
force. However, in the instant case,
the court approached the question
directly, and did not deem hypnosis
a force element sufficient to con-





an indictment for burglary, the evi-
dence against defendants consisted
entirely of the testimony of one
Kleiner who had been promised by
the State that his release on proba-
tion would be recommended. The
trial court instructed the jury that
"under the laws of the State of Illi-
nois a defendant may be convicted
upon the uncorroborated testimony
of an accomplice; and if the jury
believe from the evidence in this
case, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the testimony given by the wit-
ness Kleiner is true, then they can
act upon the same as true. The
testimony of an accomplice, like all
other evidence in the case, is for the
jury to pass upon. The jury is
further instructed that the witness
Kleiner is an accomplice in this
case." Held: on appeal, that the
judgment be reversed on the ground
that whether Kleiner was or was
not an accomplice of the defendant
was a question of fact for the jury;
and that the jury should have been
instructed that the testimony of an
accomplice is subject to grave sus-
picion and should be considered in
the light of all other evidence in
the case and the influence under
which the testimony is given.
People v. Smith (Ill. 1931) 174 N.
E. 828.
Where there is any conflict in the
testimony as to whether a witness
is or is not an accomplice, the issue
must be submitted to the jury:
Elizando v. State (1892) 31 Tex.
Cr. 237, 20 S. W. 560; Common-
,wealth v. Bisch (1896) 165 Mass.
188, 42 N. E. 560; Hargrove v.
State (1906) 125 Ga. 270, 54 S. E.
164; People v. Swersky (1916) 216
N. Y. 471, 111 N. E. 212. But
where the facts are all admitted and
no issue thereon is raised by the
evidence, it then becomes a ques-
tion of law for the court: Terri-
tory v. West (1908) 14 N. M. 546,
99 P. 343; People v. Sternberg
(1896) 111 Cal. 11, 43 P. 201;
Cudjoe v. State (1916 Okl.) 154 P.
500. Where there was no conflict
as to the evidence it was held re-
versible error for the Court to sub-
mit such question to the jury-
State v. Carr (1895) 28 Or. 389,
42 P. 215. There is nothing in the
record of the principal case indicat-
ing that there was a conflict of evi-
dence as to whether Kleiner was an
accomplice, but it was held that the
Court by deciding the case "ex-
pressed an opinion" on the most im-
portant question in the case: Peo-
ple v. Smith, supra at 830.
At common law one could be con-
victed upon the uncorroborated tes-
timony of an accomplice: King v.
Attwood (1788) 1 Leach 464. But
it was competent for the court to
caution the jury and point out the
danger of such uncorroborated
testimony: Gray v. People (1861)
26 Ill. 344; see Rex v. Jones (1809)
2 Camp. 131, 132. Such advice to
the jury was merely a "counsel of
caution" not a rule of evidence: 4
Wiginore "Evidence" (2d ed. 1923)
sec. 2056; State v. Potter (1869)
42 Vt. 495; see Cross v. People
(1868) 47 Ill. 152, 160; Collins v.
People (1881) 98 IIl. 584, 589;
State v. Stebbins (1860) 29 Conn.
462, 473. It was a matter of dis-
cretion with the trial judge and
failure to caution the jury on such
matter was not ground for a new
trial: Porath, v. State (1895) 90
Wis. 535, 63 N. W. 1061; see Com-
monwealth v. Price (1858 Mass.)
10 Gray 472, 71 Am. Dec. 668;
Cheatham v. State (1889) 67 Miss.
335, 343, 7 So. 204; State v. Hier
(1905) 78 Vt. 488, 492, 63 A. 877.
Some states have by statute turned
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the caution into a rule of law: 4
Wigmore "Evidence," supra; Ala.
Code 1923, sec. 5635; Calif. *P. C.
(1872) 1111, C. C. P., sec. 2061,
par. 4; Minn. Gen. St. 1923 C92,
sec. 9903. Illinois has no statute
but refusal of the Court, in giving
such an instruction, to include a
caution is reversible error: Hoyt
v. People (1892) 149 Ill. 588, 30 N.
E. 315. An instruction exactly the
same as that in the principal case
was held not to be erroneous be-
cause another instruction gave suf-
ficient caution: People v. Franken-
burg (1908) 236 II. 408, 86 N. E.
128. It is error to instruct the jury
that the credibility of an accomplice
is to be passed upon "as any other
witness" although following this
they are warned that the testimony
of an accomplice must be received
with great caution: People v. Ron-
getti (1930) 338 Ill. 56, 170 N. E.
14. Contra: 'People v. Rees (1915)
268 Ill. 585, 109 N. E. 473. Where
the credibility of an accomplice was
attacked it was held that the court
was under a duty to take the case
away from the jury: United States
v. Murphy (1918 N. D. of N. Y.)
253 Fed. 404. It has been held that
the jury should consider the ele-
ments of benefits or malice affect-
ing the credibility of an accomplice:
People v. Harvey (1926) -321 Ill.
361, 367, 152 N. E. 147, 149; Peo-
ple v. Elmore (1925) 318 Ill. 276,
290, 149 N. E. 286, 291.
Although conviction may be sus-
tained upon the uncorroborated
testimony of an accomplice such
testimony is open to the gravest
suspicion and the Court upon re-
view will look at all the evidence
and set aside the verdict if- satis-
fled that there is a reasonable doubt
of the defendant's guilt: People v.
Gammuto (1918) 280 III. 225, 117
N. E. 454; People v. Aiello (1922)
302 Ill. 518, 135 N. E. 62; People v.
Pattin (1919) 290 Ill. 542, 125 N.
E. 248; Cochran v. People (1918)
175 Ill. 28, 51 N. E. 845.
ESTHER NEWTON.
GAMING-SLOT MACHINE AS A
GAMBLING DEVICE-AMUSEMENT AS
A THING OF VALUE.-[Iowa] This
was an action to condemn as a
gambling device, a slot-vending ma-
chine which, upon the deposit of a
nickel, uniformly released one pack-
age of mints. In addition to the
mints there were released, at times
and in quantities determined only
by chance, brass discs or tokens,
stamped on one side, "no cash
value," and on the other side, "good
for amusement only". These tokens
remained the property of the ven-
dor and could be used only to replay
the machine for the customer's sole
amusement. Nothing of value waz
ever vended with the token, its
only function and use being, upon
deposit in the slot, to spin a set
of reels on which were printed cer-
tain phrases, and which, when they
stopped spinning, formed sentences
purporting to give humorous advice
to the player. Held, that this ma-
chine was a gambling device sub-
ject to condemnation under the
statute: Iowa Code 1927, ch. 593,
secs. 3198-13215 (prohibiting any
"game of chance", "gambling
scheme or device", or "gift enter-
prise" without definition of these
terms) : State ex rel. Manchester
V. Marvin (Iowa 1930) 233 N. W.
486.
The court, holding that the for-
tune telling feature made the vend-
ing machine a gambling device,
said, "The use of the discs had a
manifest purpose. Such purpose
was to stimulate the expectation
of the buying patron that he
CRIMINAL CASES
might' receive something more
than a package of mints . ..
Among the patrons of the machine,
some, if not many of them, might
prefer the feature of amusement
rather than the package of mints.
If these discs were made 'good'
for admission to a movie or other
place of amusement, their character
as a gambling device would be eas-
ily recognized. Something akin
thereto was their actual function as.
used." This comment will be con-
cerned chiefly with the question
whether a vending machine, by rea-
son of having attached to it an
amusement feature such as described
above, thereby becomes a gambling
device.
Since gambling was no crime at
common law: Bishop, "Statutory
Crimes" (3rd ed. 1901), sec. 846,
the terms "gambling" and "gambling
devices" have no settled and definite
meaning and often statutes fail to
define them: State v. Mann (1867)
2 Ore. 238. "To gamble is to play
or engage in a game for money or
other stake, and gambling, in its
broadest and most generic sense,
comprehends every species of game
or device of chance": Brill, "Cyc-
lopedia Criminal Law" (1922) sec.
1075. "A gambling device is any
contrivance by the operation of
which chances are determined
whereby money or property is lost
or Avon": Brill, supra, sec. 1091.
A slot machine is a gambling de-
vice where the return to the player
is dependent upon an element of
chance: Case Note (1908) 20 L.
R. A. (N. s.) 239. Even though
the player in any event re-
ceives something, and even though
that something is worth the money
spent, so that the player cannot lose,
yet the machine is a gambling de-
vice if the player stands a chance
to win "something" in addition:
Case Note (1925) 38 A. L. R. 73.
On most slot machines the cus-
tomer stakes money, and the keeper
or operator stakes money, candy,
cigars, other merchandise, or trade
checks. In the instant case, the
stake was amusement-the opera-
tion of the fortune telling device.
The customer was certain to receive
his money's worth of mints. But
the principal case held that the
chance of winning this amusement
made the mint-vending machine a
gambling device.
Generally, the value of the thing
at stake is immaterial; the statutes
do not discriminate between large
and small wagers. It was held to
be gambling to play for "money or
other thing of value" in McBride
v. State (1897) 39 Fla. 442, 22 So.
711; "money or other thing" in
Allen v. Commonwealth (1917) 178
Ky. 250; 198 S. W. 896. The term
"property" is said to include "every-
thing which is the subject of owner-
ship, corporeal or incorporeal, taig-
ible or intangible, visible or invis-
ible, real or personal; everything
that has an exchangeable value
.": Wapsie Power Co. v. City
of Tipton (1923) 197 Ia. 996, 193
N. W. 643, 645.
The right of the player to oper-
ate a machine so as to cause it to
display a card containing a funny
saying or a prophecy is clearly a
"thing" which apparently has an
"exchangeable value". Therefore,
a machine of chance upon which it
may be won is technically a
"gambling device": Green v. Hart
(1930) 41 Fed. (2d) 855 (on the
ground that the combination of the
element of chance with the induce-
ment of receiving "something" for
nothing results in gambling and that
such a saying or prophecy is "some-
thing") ; Rankin v. Mills Novelty
Co. (Ark. 1930) 32 S. W. (2d) 161
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(a device with which the customer
could play a symbolic game of base
ball was held to be a thing of value
as contributing to the amusement of
the public).
The only possible ground for
reaching a contrary result would be
to regard the amusement vended as
having so small a value that the law
will not consider it-that is, "de
minimis non curat lex". That posi-
tion was apparently taken in Overby
v. Oklahoma (Okla. 1930) 287 Pac.
796, where it was held that a slot
machine similar to the one con-
demned in the instant case was not
a gambling device, the tokens being
regarded as having no value. In
Ross v. Goodwin (1930) 40 F. (2d)
535, such a machine was condemned
because of the peculiar statute, but
the court intimated that the amuse-
ment feature was not a thing of
value.
In spite of this judicial opinion to
the contrary, the principal case is
supported by the reasoning behina
the statutes. The machine is an in-
citement to 'the gambling impulse,
and in persons of little or immature
intelligence the operation may have
that effect. The argument that no
serious injury to the morals of the
community will result from such a
machine is an argument for a legis-
lature, not for a court. In theory
such a device is no less an evil than
a roulette wheel. The difference is
one of degree, not of principle.
ABRAHAM FISHMAN.
CRIMINAL LAW - SEARCH OF
AUTOMOBILE WITHOUT WARRANT-
PROBABLE CAUSE- DISCLOSURE OF
INFORANT.-[Federal] On an in-
dictment for a violation of the Na-
tional Prohibition Act, the defend-
ant, before trial, filed a motion to
suppress the use of certain liquor
as evidence on the ground that such
evidence had been acquired by an
illegal search and seizure. Two
Federal prohibition agents, acting
on information that the defendant
would transport liquor in his auto-
mobile along a certain highway at
a certain time, intercepted the de-
fendant and, on his denial of trans-
portation, searched his car and
found a quantity of liquor, which
was later sought to be introduced in
evidence. The officers did not have
a warrant and acted solely on the
information received, taken to-
gether with the fact, known to one
officer, that the defendant had
previously been convicted of violat-
ing a liquor ordinance in a near-by
city.
On trial, the officers were asked
the name of their informant but re-
fused to disclose it, following the
policy of the Department forbidding
such disclosures. Held: that the
evidence was insufficient to estab-
lish probable cause for a search
without a warrant; that the motion
to suppress the evidence be sus-
tained and order entered according-
ly, reserving to the plaintiff the
proper exceptions. In its opinion,
the court pointed out that the testi-
mony of the informant is not al-
ways necessary to establish prob-
able cause, but that when officers
search an automobile without a war-
rant, they may be required to dis-
close every element on which they
relied to establish probable cause,
and such a rule may reasonably in-
clude the source of any information
received: United States v. Blich
(D. C., D. Wyo., 1930) 45 F. (2d)
627.
The question in this case, whether
a prohibition agent who searches an
automobile for liquor, without a
warrant, but on information which
he believes to be credible, may be
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required to disclose the name of
his informant, is but a refinement of
the broader questions as to the gen-
eral right to search an automobile
or other vehicle for transporting
liquor, without a warrant, but on
probable cause, and as to the ele-
ments going to establish probable
cause. The proposition that an
automobile suspected of being used
in the transportation of intoxicat-
ing liquor may be searched by of-
ficers without a warrant, but on
probable cause, is so well settled to-
day that it is necessary to cite only
the leading case: Carroll v. United
States (1925) 267 U. S. 132, 45
Sup. Ct. 280. In this and in other
cases, it has been pointed out that
the search of an automobile or
other vehicle is an exception to the
general rule on search and seizure
for the obvious reason that the mo-
bile character of such a vehicle
makes an immediate search impera-
tive, before the object of search
may be moved out of the jurisdic-
tion: Carroll v. United States,
supra; Moore v. State (1925) 138
Miss. 116, 103 So. 483; Peru v.
United States (C. C. A., 8th, 1925)
4 F. (2d) 881. However, even
where there is sufficient time to
procure a warrant, a failure to do
so does not invalidate the search:
Woodson v. State (1929) 111 Tex.
Cr. App. 348, 13 S. W. (2d) 102.
Various definitions have been
given as to what constitutes prob-
able cause for such a search; it has
been held that probable cause is not
restricted to information or knowl-
edge gained by the officer in the
exercise of his senses, but that
cause may be based, in whole or in
part, on information furnished to
the officer from external sources;
thus officers acted on probable cause
when "the facts and circumstances
within their knowledge and of
which they had reasonably trust-
worthy information were sufficient
in themselves to warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief that
intoxicating liquor was being trans-
ported in the automobile which they
stopped and searched": Carroll v.
United States, supia. Belief based
on the information furnished by a
credible person has been held suffi-
cient to constitute probable cause:
Moore v. State, supra. Where the
facts and circumstances lead the
officer to a reasonable belief that the
law is being violated, a search of
an automobile, without a warrant,
is justified: Ash v. United States
(C. C. A., 4th, 1924) 299 F. 277.
Some courts adopt a more exacting
test and require that such informa-
tion be received "from sources ap-
parently so reliable that a prudent
and careful person, having due re-
gard for the rights of others, would
act thereon": People v. Kainhout
(1924) 227 Mich. 172, 198 N. W.
831. Still more stringent is the
statutory requirement that where an
officer searches without a warrant,
he must have absolute personal
knowledge that the law is being
violated: State v. Simmons (1926)
192 N. C. 692, 135 S. E. 866 (P. L.
1923, c. 1, sec. 6). The determina-
tion of the presence or absence of
probable cause has been held to be
a judicial question: Story v. City
of Greenwood (1929) 158 Miss.
755, 121 So. 481; Hamilton v. State
(1928) 149 Miss. 251, 115 So. 427;
Moore v. State, supra. Probable
cause must exist before the search
is begun, and no information ac-
quired in the course of search is
admissible to establish the existence
of such cause: Sellers v. Lofton
(1929) 149 Miss. 849, 116 So. 104;
Ford v. City of Jackson (1929) 153
Miss. 616, 121 So. 278. The bur-
den of proof that the search in
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question is unreasonable arrd un-
lawful has been held to be on him
who contends for the contrary:
United 'States v. Vatune (D. C.,
1923) 292 F. 497. In some States,
a presumption exists by statute that
the officer performed his official
duty in a regular manner: State v.
District Court of Fourth Judicial
District (1925) 72 Mont., 213, 232
Pac. 201 (Rev. Codes 1921, Par.
10606).
Obviously, the most satisfactory
ground for probable cause is the in-
formation gained by the officer
through the exercise of his
senses,, and the courts have so held.
Thus where the officer sees or
smells the liquor, or sees the de-
fendant acting in a suspicious man-
ner, many courts have declared that
such knowledge is sufficient to estab-
lislh probable cause for a search
without a warrant: Smith v. State
(Tex. Cr. App., 1930) 31 S. W.
(2d) 826 (officer saw liquor in auto-
mobile); State v. Knudsen (Wash.
1929) 280 Pac. 922 (same); People
v. Krahm (1925) 230 Mich. 528,
203 N. W. 105 (same). But cf.
Hoyer v. State (1923) 180 Wis. 407,
193 N. W. 89 (holding invalid a
search made after a collision, where
officer had no suspicion of a viola-
tion until he saw the liquor in the
car). Actions of the driver of an
automobile which may lead to the
belief that the law is being violated
have been held to constitute prob-
able cause: People v. Chyc (1922)
219 Mich. 273, 189 N. W. 70 (offi-
cers saw the defendant intoxicated
beside his car); United States v.
Rembert (D. C., S. D. Tex., 1922)
284 F. 996 (officer saw driver of
automobile was intoxicated); Bord-
ers v. State (Tex. Cr. App., 1930)
27 S. W. (2d) 172 (sight of con-
tainers, coupled with the sight of
the defendant breaking bottles);
Murray v. State (Tex. Cr. App.,
1930) 29 S. W. (2d) 354 (same).
But cf. Sellers v. Lofton, supra
(holding that loud talking and
laughing and driving automobile in
a zigzag course, considered apart
from other information or lnowl-
edge, does not constitute probable
cause). See also Emite v. United
States (C. C. A., 5th, 1926) 15 F.
{2d) 623 (holding that the sight
of an automobile heavily loaded
and carefully driven over a bad
road does not constitute probable
cause). Where the officer smells
liquor, either alone or in connec-
tion with other knowledge or in-
formation, some courts have held
that this was good probable cause:
Hinds v. State (Ind. 1930) 170 N.
E. 539 (officer smelled liquor, in ad-
dition to possessing other informa-
tion); Gree v. State (Ind. 1929)
168 N. E. 581 (same); Beauchamp
v. State (Tex. Cr. App. 1930) 32
S. W. (2d) 476 (the smell of liquor,
unsupported by other evidence);
State ex rel. Hanson v. District
Court (1925) 72 Mont. 245, 233 Pac.
126 (holding that smell and sight
alone were sufficient).
As said above, the bases of prob-
able cause are not limited to sensory
knowledge, but may include in-
formation furnished to the officer
from external sources. Here the
question of establishing probable
cause is rendered more difficult due
to the infinite gradations in the type
of information received, its reliabil-
ity and sources, and similar consid-
erations, and consequently, the de-
cisions are not in accord. It ap-
pears to be well settled, however,
that mere suspiciou alone will not
constitute probable cause: King v.
State (1928) 151 Miss. 482, 118 So.
413; Karlen v. State (Ind. 1930)
174 N. E. 89. See also Hamilton
v. State, supra. The question is
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often complicated by the fact that
the officer acted partly on sensory
knowledge and partly on informa-
tion from an external source: Faut
v. State (Ind. 1929) 168 N. E. 124
(holding that information,, when
supported by circumstances within
the knowledge of the officer, is good
cause): State v. Kelly (1928) 38
Wyo., 455, 268 Pac. 571 (same);
Burnett v. State (Ind. 1929) 166
N. E. 430 (same). A very common
situation appears to be where the
officer is informed, by another of-
ficer or some other person, that a
described car will be found at a
certain place and time in the act of
transporting liquor: State ex rel.
Brown v. District Court of Fourth
Judicial District in and for Ravalli
County (1925) 72 Mont. 213, 232
Pac. 201 (information from another
officer) Hanger v. State (1928) 199
Ind. 727, 160 N. E. 449 (same);
Burnett v. State, supra (informa-
tion from private individual) ;
Jenkins v. State (Tex. Cr. App.
1930) 32 S. W. (2d) 848 (same).
In many cases, the source of the
information does not appear, the
receipt of the information alone be-
ing stated: People v. Deya (1930)
250 Mich. 692, 230 N. W. 918;
Malmin v. State (1926) 30 Ariz.
258, 246 Pac. 548, .Houck v. State
(1922) 106 Ohio St. 195, 140 N. E.
112; Johnson v. State (1928) 111
Tex. Cr. App. 417, 13 S. W. (2d)
114. It has been held that such in-
formation must be furnished by a
reliable or credible person: Kirk
V. State (1929) 111 Tex. Cr. App.
388, 13 S. W. (2d) 106; State ex
rel. Brown v. District Court, supra.
Where then the information is from
an anonymous source, as an anony-
mous telephone call, some courtn
have stated that this is not suffi-
cient to establish probable cause:
State v. Knudsen, supra; Faut v.
State, supra. But where circum-
stances within the officer's own
knowledge and observation support
such anonymous information, prob-
able cause may be established:
Faut v. State, supra
The cases seem to indicate that
where an officer has searched an
automobile without a warrant, but
on probable cause, the source of ex-
ternal information is frequently not
disclosed and more frequently is not
put in issue. Consequently, in this
class of cases, there appear to be
few decisions which treat directly
of the disclosure of the source of
information as a necessary element
to establish probable cause. The
rule in Mississippi may be cited as
an example of the requirement that
the officer must disclose the source
of his information, including the
name of his informant, on demand
of the person accused: Hamilton
v. State, supra; McNutt v. State
(1926) 143 Miss. 347, 108 So. 721;
Ford v. City of Jackson, supra;
Story v. City of Greenwood, supra.
A similar rule seems to be followed
in the Federal courts, where it has
been held that the court should
have the opportunity to examine the
information of the officer for the
purpose of ascertaining its reliabil-
ity and the fact whether such officer
was justified in believing it: United
States v. Allen (D. C., S. D. Fla.
1926) 16 F. (2d) 320; Enite v.
United States, supra.
The instant case illustrates the
very common situation where the
officers are informed by some per-
son that at a certain time and place
they may find liquor being trans-
ported in a described automobile or
by a described person. Here the
defendant demanded to know the
source of the information relied
upon to institute the search without
warrant, but the officers refused to
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disclose it. In holding that the of-
ficers must disclose every element
going to estahbi'i- probable cause,
and that such disclosure might rea-
sonably inqlude the name of the in-
formant, the District Court was in
accord with the prevailing rule in
some States and in the higher Fed-
eral courts: Emite v. United




TURE SHOWS ON SUNDAY.-[Texas]
Two decisions from Texas again
present the problem of operating
motion picture show entertainments
on Sunday. In one case a sign in
front of defendant's theater read:
"Regular Admission-10c & 30c-
Today Your Free Will Offering."
Defendant was found guilty of vio-.
lating the Sunday law, set out in the
Texas Penal Code, articles 286, 287,
in keeping open a place of public
amusemenl for traffic on Sunday.
Held, on appeal, that the conviction
-should be affirmed because the "free
will offering" was a mere subter-
fuge to circumvent charging an ad-
mission fee. The opinion also
stated that the Code sections are not
unconstitutional in excepting cer-
tain businesses from the operation
of the Sunday law. Sayeg v. State
(Tex. Crim. App. 1930) 25 S. W.
(2d) 865. By the second decision
the defendant was fined for keeping
a picture show open on the Sabbath.
Held, on appeal, that the informa-
tion charging the offense was suffi-
cient. Hodge v. State (Tex. Crim.
App. 1930. 32 S. W. (2d) 191.
There appear to be no decisions
convicting persons for attending
performances on the Lord's Day as
patrons. Conviction of owners or
employees operating motion picture
shows on Sunday have been justi-
fied under several types of Sunday
law statutes, but generally the ac-
cused persons have been held crim-
inally responsible for violating gen-
eral statutes prohibiting disturbing
"the peace and good order of so-
ciety by labor, works of necessity
and charity" (or mercy) -'excepted."
Illinois Rev. Stat. (Cahill 1929)
ch. 38, sec. 573, 574; (Smith-
Hurd Annot'd 1930) ch. 38, sec.
549, 550. On what constitutes
"necessity" or "charity" see (1926,
1927) 12 St. Louis Law Rev. 77-80,
123-138; (1923) 9 Va. Law Rev.
473-5 (violation is a question of
fact for jury); (1922) 94 Central
Law J. 12. Cases of convictions
under this type of statute include:
Rosenbaum V. State (1917) 131 Ark.
251, 199 S. W. 388, State v. Ryan
(1908) 80 Conn. 582, 69 Atl. 536;
Gillooley v. Vaughn (1926) 92 Fla.
943, 110 So. 653 (combined with
municipal ordinance); State v.
Kelly (1930) 129 Kan. 849, 284 Pac.
363; State v. Blair (1930) 130 Kan.
863, 288 Pac. 729; Capitol Theater
Co. v. Commonwealth (1918) 178
Ky. 780, 199 S. W. 1076 ("profit
for amusement"); State v. Smith
and cases seq. (1921) 19 Okla. Cr.
184, 198 Pac. 879 ("servile labor");
State v. Kennedy (Mo. App. 1925)
277 S. W. 943. The Illinois statute,
supra, appears not to have been in-
voked directly in a prosecution by
the State as applying to Sabbath
operation of a cinema show. Con-
fusion in New York on the same
type of statute is shown by Frohlich
arid Schwartz "The Law of Motion
Pictures and the Theater" (1918)
sec. 120. A conviction was obtained
as late as People ex rel. Bender v.
Joyce (1916) 161 N. Y. S. 771, 174
App. Div. 574, but now Sunday
photoplay performers are permitted
by statute: see Wertheimer v.
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Schwab (1925) 210 N. Y. S. 312,
315, 124 Misc. 822. The exception
of theaters and places of amuse-
ment from Sunday laws is also seen
in City of Bogalusa v. Blanchard
(1917) 141 La. 33, 74 So. 588.
Another type of statute is that
which forbids Sabbath motion pic-
ture performances for pay; Sunday
operation was within the prohibi-
tion of such statute in Consolidated
Enterprises Inc. v. State (1924) 150
Tenn. 148, 263 S. W. 74; State ex
rel. Temple v. Barnes (1911) 22
N. D. 18, 132 N. W. 215. Cf: State
v. Goethal (1921) 44 S. D. 222,
182 N. W. 943 (statute held to pro-
hibit only certain kinds of picture
films on Sunday). A statute for-
bidding "theatrical performances"
was found applicable in Richards
v. State (1924) 110 Ohio St. 311,
143 N. E. 714, (1924) 11 Va. Law.
Rev. 60-2. Contra: State v. Penny
(1910) 42 Mont. 118, 111 Pac. 727
(strict construction of "theater").
Further cases Qf convictions are as
follows: Crawford v. City of Pas-
cagoula (1920) 123 Miss. 131, 85
So. 181; State v. Rosenburg (N. J.
1915) 115 Atl. 203, (1922) 2 Boston
Univ. Law Rev. 214 ("disorderly
house") see Hogan v. Firth (N. J.
1921) 115 Atl. 204 ("worldly busi-
ness"); State v. Reade (1923) 98
N. J. L. 596, 121 Atl. 288 ("play-
house for gain").
The principal cases are only two
of a numerous series from Texas
arising under the Texas Penal Code,
which forbids a place of public
amusement to be open for traffic
on Sunday: Spooner v. State (Tex.
1916) 182 S. W. 1121; Zuccaro v.
State (1917) 82 Tex. Cr. R. 1, 197
S. W. 982, L. R. A. 1918B 354,
361n; Heginan v. State (1921) 88
Tex. Cr. R. 548, 227 S. W. 954;
Brockman v. State (Tex. 1930) 28
S. W. (2d) 820, 29 S. W. (2d)
790; Fulgham v. State (Tex. 1930)
29 S. W. (2d) 791.
In addition to State v. Penny,
supra, cases which indicate that
Sunday picture shows are not in
contravention of the local Sunday
laws are: State v. Morris (1916)
28 Ida. 599, 155 Pac. 296 (religious
lecture illustrated by pictures-con-
viction under statute against Sun-
day operation of "any theater" re-
versed) ; S t a t e v. Chamberlain
(1910) 112 Minn. 52, 127 N. W. 444
(Sunday photoplay show is not
within the Lord's Day statute
against . "public sports, exercises,
and shows").
In conclusion, it would be well
to mention that a defendant's crim-
inal responsibility for operating a
cinema performance on the Sab-
bath usually arises by way of in-
dictment or information, but cases
have appeared where an injunction
against a Sunday show was sought
on the grounds of nuisance. In-
junctive relief was granted in Al-
bany Theater v. Short (Ga. 1930)
154 S. E. 895. Contra: State v.
Barry (Tex, 1919) 212 S. W. 304.
217 S. W. 957 (a dignified per-
formance was neither a nuisance
nor injury to property rights al-
though the acts charged constituted
a violation of the Penal Code; same
sections as involved in the principal
cases). However, courts are not in
the habit of granting an injunction
to enforce' the criminal law: Twig-
gar v. Rosenburg (1916) 163
N.. Y. S. 771; Lyric Theater Co. v.
State (1911) 98 Ark. 437, 136 S. W.
174; Carrell v. State ex rel. Little
(1911) 33 L. R. A. (N. s.) 325n.
D. V. LANSDEN.
